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The issue of corporate R&D management has become particularly relevant during the last
decade, since many industrial sectors experienced growing complexity in their research areas
and increasing constraints in budgets devoted to R&D activities. This paper discusses the cases
of the ICT and automotive sectors, exploring the changes in managerial procedures and
strategies that two of the largest corporate research centres in Italy (Telecom Italia Lab and
Centro Ricerche Fiat) adopted during a delicate phase of transition.
Both cases are characterized by a growing pressure towards the effective integration of
short-term and long-term perspectives, i.e. towards a balance between valorization of research
results and competencies, and exploration of new technological trajectories. The solutions
adopted by the two organizations are explored and discussed. Specifically, while TiLab
focused on the promotion of controlled spin-off companies, CRF has been very active in local
technology transfer, especially in favour of SMFs.
1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to discuss thebroad issue of the definition of robust
strategies for large R&D centres and analyse
two specific different sets of strategies adopted in
two of the largest industrial laboratories in Italy,
during an interesting phase of transition. The first
case study regards the Fiat Research Centre
(Centro Ricerche Fiat – CRF) which is active in
a broad range of automotive-related technolo-
gies. Its main peculiarity lies in its capacity of
keeping the same level of activities (and per-
sonnel) during severe financial and market crises
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which the Fiat Group experienced in the last
years (and at present). As a matter of fact, CRF is
now well placed to pursue further growth
strategies and keep increasing its knowledge base
despite the current international crisis in the auto-
motive sector. The second case refers to the R&D
organization of the largest Italian telecommuni-
cation operator and former monopolist (Telecom
Italia Lab – TiLab). In the period of time that
we took into account (1999–2001), this centre has
undergone several reorganization efforts. Two
were the main driving forces of these changes.
The first is a challenge shared by other interna-
tional TLC R&D centres as well, and has to do
with the attempt to integrate the development of
information and telecommunication technolo-
gies. The second driver is unique to Telecom
Italia, as these reorganizations mainly correspond
to ownership changes. The owner of the labora-
tory used to be the State, then a private entre-
preneur managed to buy out the Group, and
finally the Pirelli Group got in control of Telecom
Italia. In this process, various attempts have been
made to transform a centre characterized by
scientific excellence in a quasi-for profit research
centre. Other important organization changes are
going on at present, and their analysis goes beyond
the purpose of this study. Only a few years from
now it will become possible to understand where
these changes are taking the Group to.
Both the automotive and the telecommunica-
tion sectors have experienced complex and
distinct dynamics, characterized by sectoral de-
regulation and an increasing integration of TLC
and IT technologies, in the case of the telecom
sector, and by a decline in world demand and an
increasing product complexity, in the case of the
automotive sector. These changes have led to
significant reorganization processes and difficult
strategic decisions in the two cases, including a
rethinking of their research centres’ role. The
struggle to keep structural costs as low as possible
obliges firms to define ambitious expectations for
their R&D labs, i.e. to guarantee both long term
technology-based growth opportunities as well as
short term revenues. TiLab and CRF experienced
exactly such a cultural change, since they ceased
to be cost centres, and became autonomous
business units, with the goal of producing cash
flows in order to justify expenses. Hence, our
research hypothesis is that, in both cases, mana-
gers had to face the fact that an investment in
R&D could not possibly be justified with a coura-
geous exploration of technology trajectories. Ex-
ploration and exploitation could not possibly be
seen as conflicting missions for the R&D lab,
since today they have to fulfil both of them.
Nonetheless, important differences do exist in
the two cases, and especially in the events that
determined the change in their corporate missions
and in the strategies adopted for their accom-
plishment. CRF has been very active in local
technology transfer, especially in favour of SMFs
– most of which operating as suppliers in the
automotive sector – often through the transfer of
human resources, and the charismatic leadership
of its CEO was of fundamental importance.
TiLab’s strategic reorientation has been somehow
more complex and certainly more corporate-led,
surely influenced by changes in corporate govern-
ance; it was based, among other factors, on the
promotion of spin-off companies.
The role played by these two large research
centres in the Italian national innovation system is
very important, due to the fact that there are only
a few laboratories in the country with more than
1000 people. Most of these labs used to operate in
rather stable markets, with relevant resources for
exploration activities and a not very demanding
corporate level. On the contrary, at present, the
customer, mainly the corporate level, is much
more likely to finance projects whose goal is the
exploitation of measurable, short term results with
a consistent value added. Obviously, the risk of
this orientation is excessive short-termism and the
impoverishment of competencies and abilities to
be trend-spotters in the long period.
Two events determined radical changes in the
strategies adopted in the two R&D laboratories
under study.
The first one is the crisis of the Fiat Group in
the early nineties. During this crisis all Fiat
Group companies started a radical restructuring
process to regain competitiveness. However, CRF
management asked the corporate level to access a
broader, non-Group market for its technological
assets and competencies, in order to be able to
demonstrate that it could survive without any
downsizing. The decision was not easy to take,
but the lab was finally allowed to do so and since
then it sells research to a broad range of com-
panies, obviously keeping in touch with the mother
company, which has a first-option privilege.
In the second case, the nineties brought an
important element in the TLC sector. The 1996
Telecommunications Deregulation Act in the
USA testified that the deregulation and privatiza-
tion of the market was on its way. The EU
undertook this process as well. In 1997 the Open
Network Provision substituted the 1987 Green
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Book (which recognized the necessity of a mono-
poly at least for the network and the infrastruc-
tures). Every country member was strongly
advised to open the TLC market to competition
as soon as possible. The 1997 directive regulates
the free access to the networks and a precise inter-
connectivity policy, the use of European standard
to create an integrated continental network. New
competition on the domestic markets and new
possibilities on the foreign markets have then
become important incentives for the search of an
equilibrium between exploration and exploita-
tion, between the production of market-ready
solutions and a broader analysis of the foresee-
able technological paths. The exploitation of
R&D activities and projects therefore became a
priority and a difficult task for TiLab. The main
problem is the fact that the typical supplier-
customer relationship is not fully compatible with
the typical interactions that occur between a
company and its research lab. No matter the
strategic decision of the management, the client
that belongs to the same industrial group is a very
peculiar type of customer. TiLab was used to
have abundant budgets to carry out long-term
research, and had to adapt to a new operating
framework.
2. The rethinking of R&D activity within
corporate strategies and organizations
During the nineties, a vast literature has focused
on the structural changes that corporate R&D
management has experienced. Researchers have
described these changes in both their technologi-
cal and strategic nature. Many industrial sectors
experienced growing complexity in their research
areas. In particular, the most significant and wide-
spread phenomenon has been the integration of
various technological realms for the same appli-
cations. The integration with information tech-
nologies has been the most significant example
(Rao, 1999). A second, vastly discussed change,
has been the growing attention to the costs of
corporate R&D activities (Rao, 2000). The largest
corporations were the first organizations which
had to adopt strategic, often radical solutions.
Empirical evidence shows that these changes
did not necessarily led to disinvestments in R&D,
but certainly determined significant reassessments
of the innovation strategy (Duysters and Hage-
doorn, 1996). There is broad agreement on the
fact that the emergence of international and
national strategic technological partnerships has
been the most common reaction to these changes.
A study of the World Bank (Vonortas and
Safioleas, 1997), tried to empirically map partner-
ships in the IT sector, showing a clear increase in
recent times. Other case studies (among others,
Granstrand, 1999), explain the specific benefits
connected with international R&D cooperation.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the
emergence of collaboration in the R&D sector
was unlikely, due to high transaction costs
(Mowery, 1995). Rao (1999) argues that the rise
of technological complexity may represent the
incentive to overcome the difficulties, risks and
costs involved. In fact, as complexity increases, it
becomes more profitable to establish technologi-
cal partnerships with competitors, suppliers and
clients, and to focus on a specific technological
core (Chiesa et al., 1999), rather than to try and
make everything ‘in-house’. It has also been
pointed out (Godoe, 2000), that one of the most
important consequences of this internation-
al division of labour, is the increasing risk of a
technological ‘lock in’ effect when the ‘core’ leads
the research centre, and its partners, along the
wrong technological trajectory. A partial solution
to this problem is the focus on ‘diversity within
the network’, which is considered to be an
important drive for R&D productivity.
The automotive and TLC sectors are among
the most innovative industries in the manufactur-
ing and service sectors (Evangelista and Sirilli,
1998), and they were both affected by these
transformations. The driver for change was not
only growing technological complexity. These
two industries were also affected by growing
competition, the liberalization of the TLC mar-
ket, and decreasing operative margins in the
automotive industry (Lera, 2000).
Two were the main streams of the debate
resulting from these changes. The first one
focused on the measurement of the R&D invest-
ment assessment. The second had to do with the
analysis of the consequences on the company’s
innovativeness, of an R&D more exposed to
market pressure. Both these two fields provide the
most important research questions that need to
be addressed by researchers.
In fact, researchers have long been debating
about how to measure and assess R&D invest-
ment, and this activity has become more and
more important in industrial R&D organization.
The net present value approach, focused on the
definition of sound parameters to estimate risk
discount rates. Due to the nature of R&D
investment and returns, this method produced
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unsatisfactory results. New approaches, such as
the calculation of the option value, try to over-
come this problem, with more complex stochastic
models (Pennings and Lint, 1997). Another
approach (see Ransley, 1994 and Rush et al.,
1995) used a benchmarking technique to measure
and evaluate performances and choices of R&D
labs and researchers.
As for the second research question, authors
think that, in order to cope with shortening
product development cycle times and decreasing
budgets, R&D investments need to be focused on
the most immediate needs of customers (Cooper
et al., 1998). It has been argued that markets are
usually very good in matching supply and
demand, but they are bad advisers when the firm
is trying to define its R&D strategy (Chesbrough
and Teece, 1996). In particular, long term growth
could be jeopardized by an excessive focus on
short term results, incremental innovations, and
therefore shortermism of the R&D investment
(Calderini and Garrone, 2001). These considera-
tions lead to two open research questions, such as
how to measure this shortermism phenomenon
(in the already cited Calderini and Garrone, 2001,
the authors use publications and patents), and
whether the continuous disinvesting in research
and the growing focus on development, could
lead to undesired long term effects (Godoe, 2000).
3. Technology transfer and the transfer of
human capital: the case of CRF
3.1. Background
Centro Ricerche Fiat employs nowadays more
than 900 workers, had revenues of about h111
millions in 2002, and is one of the 12 sectors
which compose the Fiat Group.1 Created in 1976,
since 1979 CRF is an independent centre of the
Fiat Group, which means that it can autono-
mously take strategic decisions. At corporate
level, Fiat maintains the definition of economic
and financial rules for the management of human
resources. CRF’s h25 millions book capital is
completely owned by the other sectors of the Fiat
Group, with Fiat Auto, Magneti Marelli and
Iveco owning the largest shares.
The degree of independence of CRF from the
Fiat Group can be first appreciated by looking at
the composition of its turnover. Indeed, about
50% of CRF’s turnover comes directly from
Group’s orders, while the remaining 50% comes
from external sources. This latter is then sub-
divided into public funds received for the parti-
cipation to national and European research prog-
rammes, and transfers from firms external to the
Fiat Group – especially SMEs – for technological
services. Over time, the degree of independency
from the mother company has constantly in-
creased, mainly due to a precise strategic choice.
Indeed, the fall in world demand that the
automotive sector experienced in 1993 has clearly
shown that the whole sector is subject to demand
fluctuations, and that having strict economic
linkages with only one sector could reveal a very
risky strategy.
The role of CRF within the Fiat Group, and its
increasing independence from the mother com-
pany, are also the result of relevant historical
events. In 1993, most Fiat Sectors reacted to the
industry’s crisis by refocusing their activities and
by reducing the overall number of workers. CRF
took the opposite direction. CRF did not reduce
its activities or fire researchers; rather, it tried to
enlarge the sources of revenues, by increasingly
taking part to publicly-funded research program-
mes, and by offering its services to customers ex-
ternal to the Fiat Group. This strategy was mainly
the result of a long-term vision of its top manage-
ment. The early success of this strategy gave CRF
a sense of independence and dynamism much
greater than what the simple budget figures could
imply, and allowed CRF to follow a path of
expansion and growth.
As for technology transfer strategy, it is mainly
the result of choices operated by the Fiat Group.
On the one hand, CRF receives from the mother
company and from other firms belonging to the
Fiat Group only ‘finalized’ orders. In turn, funds
received from this source cannot be employed in
long-term activities of exploration of new re-
search trajectories. On the other hand, the inde-
pendence of CRF from the Group forces CRF to
adopt a market-based approach of continuous
improvement. In the words of a widely cited CRF
slogan, technology transfer activities become
‘CCCP – Competitiveness for Customers at
Competitive Prices’.
3.2. CRF’s organization and ‘exploration’
strategy
The design of CRF’s organization responded to
the objectives of technology transfer and explora-
tion of long-term research trajectories. Following
a major restructuring in 1998, CRF has been
organized in a matrix-form, composed of ten
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technological areas (aggregated in three divisions
– vehicles, engines and other technologies) and six
staff areas. Whereas the ten technological areas
identify CRF’s competencies (mainly focused on
automotive and transport sectors), the six staff
areas respond to the need of organizing those com-
petencies according to specific strategic choices.
Among the various staff functions, Research
Promotion is a key activity in pursuing both
exploitation and exploration strategies. First, it
identifies, from an organizational point of view,
the strategic focus on research transfer. CRF’s
transfer policy is to develop products, processes
and technologies to be effectively transferred
to the clients. This transfer process is entirely
planned at the beginning of a research project,
which is usually not launched unless the expected
outputs and the related customers’ advantages
are clearly defined. Hence, each research project
is composed of a plan of action, which is part of a
major activity plan.
Second, the Research Promotion function plays
the role of facilitating CRF’s participation in
publicly-funded research programmes. In parti-
cular, this function’s role is to create an interna-
tional research network to be activated when
CRF intends to take part in research programmes
promoted by the European Union or other
governmental authorities. Since the creation of
this function, CRF’s participation in national and
European research programmes has constantly
increased. At the EU level, from 1991 to 1996,
Fiat (through CRF) has become the European
car producer with the highest number of pro-
jects approved and financed within the Brite-
Euram programme (see Table 1 for the last two
years). During the 1999–2002 period, 198 research
projects promoted by CRF have been approved
and funded within the Fifth Framework Pro-
gramme. Similar results were also obtained for the
Competitive Growth and IST programmes.
This function plays a key role in CRF’s
strategy, for two main reasons. On the one hand,
by participating in publicly-funded research
programmes, CRF strengthens its financial (and
strategic) autonomy from the Fiat Group. In-
deed, the share of this source of revenues in
CRF’s budget has constantly increased over the
last years. On the other hand, by participating in
these programmes, CRF reduces the share of
revenues received on specific orders – such as
orders from the Group, and from some external
firms – which usually consist of short-term applied
research activities. In doing so, CRF can partly
spend its resources on longer-term research
projects, not directly finalized to produce specific
outputs, but that allow CRF to explore new
potentially innovative technological trajectories.
3.3. The ‘exploitation’ phase
The technology transfer strategy pursued by CRF
is composed of different phases. Two of the most
relevant ones are: (a) the search for ‘proper’
clients; (b) the development of ‘proper’ products
(Michellone, 1995). CRF usually makes a deep
analysis of these phases before starting any tran-
sfer process, in order to exactly identify concrete
opportunities, the means by which to transfer
research results, and the existence of strategic
constraints.
CRF’s strategy primarily derives its strength
from a clear focus on customers. Unlike the com-
mon behaviour of many research centres where
the commercialization of outputs is taken into
account only after having obtained research
results, CRF follows a different path. The identi-
fication of customers and their needs represents
the first, initial phase of the process, and research
activity follows at a later stage. Results only come
at the end.
At the same time, the focus on customers has a
deeper meaning. In many firms (especially
SMEs), the introduction of innovations and new
technologies often represents a drastic change in
their organization, routines and capabilities. This
means that CRF needs to identify the proper
persons within customers’ organizations in order
to start an effective interaction. CRF’s strategy is
to make a distinction between macro- and micro-
clients. Macro-clients are usually identified in the
clients’ top managers (the entrepreneur, in the
case of SMEs), who are among the first to
Table 1. Participation to the Brite-Euram programme
(1995 and 1996) and to the 5th European Framework
Programme (automotive Eucar projects).
Car manufacturer 1995 (%) 1996 (%) 5th FP
Fiat (Crf) 26 30 25
DB/DC 19 17 18
Renault 10 15 14
PSA 10 8 8
Volvo 9 10 12
BMW 9 8 3
VW 9 5 9
Rover 3 5 –
Opel 3 1 2
Ford 2 1 8
Porsche – – 1
Total 100 100
Source: our elaboration on Deiana (1996) and Crf.
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perceive technological needs and are interested in
financing an innovative project. On the con-
trary, micro-clients are identified in those groups
of people within each firm who will have to
manage – and directly pay for, in some cases – the
innovation. While the former have an active role
in the process, the latter have often a passive one.
Thus, the distinction between these two cate-
gories of clients becomes relevant in order to
define the ‘price’ that each of them will be asked
to pay for the innovation (see Figure 1).
The price macro-clients have to pay is more
than the expense of R&D activities, and com-
prises the costs of additional investments and
organizational changes needed to transform the
introduction of a technological innovation into
competitive advantage. On the contrary, micro-
clients do not pay a ‘monetary’ price for the
introduction of a technological innovation. The
more radical the technological change, the higher
the price they have to pay in terms of new skills,
competencies and knowledge they have to learn
and adopt. The adoption pattern has in this case
strong emotional features, and a complete success
can be guaranteed only by reducing obstacles to
the transfer, and by avoiding the ‘not invented
here’ syndrome.
Then, in order to define the ‘proper’ output to
be offered to customers, CRF has first to identify
customers’ needs. However, in the case of complex
high-tech products, customers might have un-
expressed requirements, or might not have the
capability to exactly define outputs’ characteris-
tics. Both expressed and latent needs have to be
analysed in order to obtain success in the research
activity (Tidd et al., 1997). In such a case, a strict
developer-user interaction is normally required
(Leonard-Barton and Sinha, 1993). Hence, CRF
pays attention to a correct specification of the
‘product chain’, by using techniques such as
Quality Function Deployment (Burn, 1990). These
techniques help firms to translate customers’
needs in technical and functional specifications
to be used in product development.
CRF uses a four-level approach to define
products (Michellone, 1995). The first level
corresponds to generic products, which satisfy
minimal customer’s expectations, and include
basic requirements. For example, customers will
ask CRF’s respect of development costs and time,
but also of functional specifications – in terms of
quality and reliability. At the second level, CRF
defines the expected product, which both satisfies
customer’s minimal requirements and its (latent)
expectations. At this level, product definition has
to take into account its impact on customer’s
investments, and managerial and organizational
change. The third level – integrated product –
introduces competitiveness. The goal is to inte-
grate technical and technological dimensions with
the market dimension, in order to increase the
probability of success for those firms adopting the
new technology. This requires CRF to intervene
in all relevant aspects of firms’ organizations,
especially by interacting with micro-clients inside
organizations. Finally, at the fourth level, CRF
defines the potential product. The basic idea is
that ‘customer’s customers’ have to be taken into
account, so that by introducing the new technol-
ogy, CRF’s customers can actually respond to
their customers’ needs.
In sum, CRF’s effort is to define products at
the fourth level. But this implies relevant techno-
logical, organizational and managerial effort.
CRF’s researchers are required not only to in-
tegrate know-how and competencies from differ-
ent technological areas, but also to analyse the
complex environment in which customers usually
operate. Indeed, customers’ success depends on
the fact that their networks of suppliers, dis-
tributors, and other external agents can positively
react to changes induced by the new technology.
In turn, CRF’s success is strictly related to its
capacity of preventing these changes, and the
tensions that will emerge with the external system
of relationships.
3.4. Knowledge transfer and the transfer
of human resources
CRF’s attention to technology transfer and to the
proper definition of outputs to be transferred is
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Figure 1. Segmentation of customers.
Source: our elaboration on Michellone, 2001.
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paralleled by similar attention to the management
of human resources. Indeed, CRF’s transfer
process towards customers is often complemented
with the transfer of human resources, i.e. of those
CRF’s researchers actively involved in the devel-
opment of the technology to be transferred. The
transfer of human resources represents the most
complete form of technology transfer, since to-
gether with the researchers all their tacit knowl-
edge is transferred as well. In this sense, cognitive
problems in technology transfer are almost com-
pletely resolved when transferring human re-
sources. However, this also creates some problems
for CRF, concerning the loss of specific techno-
logical competences, and the management of
researchers’ turnover. Thus, in many cases, the
transfer of human resources is planned at the
beginning of the transfer process, for example by
means of coordinated training programmes. For
instance, many young researchers that are initially
involved in new research projects and are directly
trained for those projects, are then transferred
with the research project to the client firm. In this,
CRF satisfies an institutional task within the Fiat
Group: that of creating relevant human capital.
Advantages of this approach are twofold.
From the customer’s viewpoint, the transfer of
human resources makes technology transfer com-
pletely effective. Indeed, all tacit knowledge and
know-how is transferred to the customer, which
realizes that researchers have been trained on that
specific technology. From the CRF’s viewpoint,
that same researcher who is transferred to a
customer represents the future preferred interface
between CRF and the customer itself, and allows
CRF to create even stronger linkages with it. In
turn, this approach increases customer’s loyalty,
as it creates mechanisms of cognitive and
organizational lock-in, and increases customer’s
costs of moving to different suppliers.
However, this approach creates internal pro-
blems with regard to the management of human
resources. CRF’s reaction to this problem is to
constantly map its internal competencies, in order
to identify those that can be transferred, and
those that have to be acquired. Following Hamel
and Prahalad (1994), CRF makes a distinction
between core competencies (that create a distinc-
tive value to the firm in the long-run), standard
competencies (that can be easily found in the
external market), and actual competencies (that
maintain and increase CRF’s competitiveness of
actual products and technologies).
It is worth noting that actual competencies are
usually transferred to external customers. Their
presence is a key competitive factor for CRF con-
cerning actual products, processes and methodol-
ogies, but not in the long-run. In the long-run
they have either to be sold or re-trained. At the
same time, they represent a key factor for com-
petitiveness of CRF’s customers, and often be-
come the core competencies of customers. In turn,
by transferring those resources to customers,
CRF obtains a direct economic benefit, and an
indirect benefit in costs reduction for avoiding
future re-training programmes.
By adopting this approach, CRF annually
transfers a relevant share of its researchers to
external firms. In the last ten years, the average
annual turnover of researchers has been about
8.9%, the share of employees with a Laurea
degree has been about 55%, and their average age
has been 33 (Michellone, 2001). CRF manages
this high turnover by following two different sets
of solutions. On the one hand, the size of the
organization is virtually increased, by signing
collaborative agreements with about 650 partners
and suppliers, towards which about 25% of annual
budget is usually spent. Furthermore, CRF an-
nually supports more than 100 university students
and more than 100 post-graduate students who
spend part of their time at CRF to complete their
Laurea thesis or for a stage period. Most of these
students are then hired by CRF itself or by CRF’s
customers, hence feeding the process of interaction
between CRF and its customers described above.
4. Technology exploitation via spin-off
creation: the case of TiLab
During the nineties, research centres operating in
the Tlc sector went through relevant changes for
which two main interpretations are possible.
First, the deregulation process led to the emer-
gence of new actors, which made the market more
fluid and complex; often incumbent firms faced
for the first time a real competitive environment.
Moreover, profitability and competition in the
new business sectors, and the necessary ability to
adopt new technologies, led to a stricter control
of overhead costs, and in particular those related
to R&D activities. The former monopolists are
today trying to find new ways to achieve or keep
profitability in a rapidly changing market, and
are therefore setting new demands, objectives and
pressures on their R&D centres.
As a consequence, R&D centres are trying to
find additional financial resources, especially
from outside their industrial group, which in
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many cases is diminishing available resources,
and to exploit externalities from R&D activities.
New business models and competencies are be-
coming significant and used in the sector, although
a variety of technology strategies are being
followed in various large Tlc companies. Among
these, efforts have been made for the development
of spin-off companies and incubators, as well as
for the setting up of specialized competencies for
the marketing of inventions. Some research centres
are also trying to develop new venture capital
activities to detect and attract new ideas, technol-
ogies or business opportunities.
4.1. Background
Telecom Italia Lab (TiLab) is the company of the
Telecom Italia Group devoted to promote
innovation in the ICT field through the develop-
ment of new technologies and the definition of
new business opportunities by means of venture
capital operations. It was created in 2001 by
merging the pre-existing Telecom Italia research
centre (the large and consolidated Cselt – Centro
Studi E Laboratori Telecomunicazioni) and the
young Telecom Italia ‘Venture Capital & Innova-
tion’ business unit, plus three other smaller
research laboratories belonging to the same
group – i.e. the Future Centre in Venice (Italy),
the Consumer Lab in Rome (Italy), and the Tech-
nology Observatory in San Francisco (CA).
Today the centre employs 1100 people; significant
restructuring is under way to integrate TiLab in
the new structure of the Pirelli Group and in
particular to create synergies with Pirelli Labs.
Up until 2001, the focus of Cselt had been to
promote research, experimentation and qualifica-
tion in the telecommunication and information
technologies sectors. Its purpose was to do re-
search and provide the best technologies and
competencies for all the companies of the group.
In 1999, Cselt personnel consisted of about 1,200
researchers. Its budget was about 280 billion Lira
(about 140 million Euros). The flow of revenues
from companies outside the Telecom Italia group
grew in the last years (see Figure 2). This is an
important proxy for the level of market-oriented
activities performed by the Centre.
During the nineties, Telecom Italia undertook
radical changes which affected the role and
organization of its research labs. The first radical
change was the privatization of the former public
monopolist – although the Italian State retained
golden-share privileges – and the consequent
creation of the Telecom Italia Group. A second
important event was Roberto Colaninno’s acqui-
sition of the group in February 1999. Colaninno
was the CEO of the Omnitel/Tecnost Group, the
biggest competitor of Telecom Italia. Antitrust
laws prevented the creation of a new (private)
quasi-monopoly, and Omnitel had to be sold.
Colaninno’s adventure in Telecom Italia lasted
two years. A new buyout in 2001 led the indus-
trial group Pirelli into control of Telecom. The
Italian government chose not to interfere with
these changes.
During this period, Cselt/TiLab enlarged its
mission and changed its organization. In 1997 a
functional organization was introduced, and 11
areas were defined. Gradually, the 1997 organiza-
tion changed into a ‘systematic solution’, with a
project-based division of labour, which allowed
Cselt to answer more efficiently to the interdisci-
plinary demands coming from the other compa-
nies of the Group. The capacity to offer inter-
disciplinary and systemic solutions was clearly
identified as one of the main asset of the lab.
In March 2001 another important change in
Cselt/TiLab structure was introduced, with the
goal of rendering it a real ‘innovation company’,
able to develop and exploit the multiple and com-
plex activities of the Group. Tilab was reorga-
nized in three business areas: Technology Integra-
tion & Research, Venture Capital, and ICT Skill
Building. The objective of these changes was to
create an extremely flexible organization, able to
integrate new realities, through the creation of
autonomous unities, partnership with external
subjects, and financial participation to new
entrepreneurial activities. Tilab has also become
the incubator for innovative initiatives, both from
internal scientific and technological activities, or
only indirectly related to them, such as new
strategic alliances, new business opportunities,
Figure 2. Cselt Revenues (billions Italian Liras).
Source: TiLab.
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and so on. This activity, however, is not parti-
cularly successful.
One of the most interesting examples of
activities that emerged from these choices was
Loquendo. The project started in February 2001
with the objective of exploring new business
possibilities and exploiting the competencies of
Cselt in the important field of voice recognition.
TiLab management decided to allow Loquendo
to operate as an independent company with pro-
prietary technology not commercialized by Tele-
com Italia. Customers for Loquendo are today
large firms, other telecom operators and Internet
providers. The most important application was
VoxNauta, which enabled the access and the
browsing of databases and the Internet through a
voice recognition system.
Besides such activities, TiLab kept providing
more traditional services to the Telecom Italia
Group, such as studies and feasibility tests, ex-
periments, and normative specifications. However,
TiLab focused its activities on the exploitation of
internal competencies for the generation of new
revenues. In the following sections we will focus
on these activities.
4.2. The observatory and technological
collaborations
As it has been described, the setting up of TiLab
led to substantial changes for the venture capital
business unit of Telecom Italia, and new forms of
technological transfer within the Group. Cselt
had always been an ‘observatory point’ for new
trends and technologies in the ICT sector. During
the reorganization phase that we are describing,
these observatory activities have been strength-
ened with the introduction of new programmes,
resources and infrastructures that allowed TiLab
to interact more directly with organizations out-
side the group. There are two categories of pos-
sible interlocutors. First, SMEs operating in the
ICT sector. Second, other possible ‘emerging
talents’. The goal was to hunt for partnerships
(or acquisitions) and placements in TiLab.
In pursuing this goal, Tilab decided to offer
assistance to the start-up and development of
SMEs operating in the ICT sector. An important
aspect of this technology transfer strategy was to
exploit the spillovers from internal research
activities. Loquendo represented one of the first
initiatives in the field. Moreover, the goal was to
offer universities and SMEs financial instruments,
competencies and infrastructures to develop
entrepreneurial ideas (see Figure 3).
The definition of a new Venture Capital Area
was the final achievement of this business model.
However, the risks and opportunities connected
with venture capital activities are complex.
Expected financial returns have to be clearly
identified, and specialized operators are needed,
in order to fully evaluate the risks involved.
The role of a research centre that operates on
the venture capital market is to be an early spotter
of emerging trends, technologies and possibilities.
This is possible only if the observatory is located
close to the sources of innovation, like universi-
ties, customers, users and other competitors. Such
a position allows the research centre to reduce
Figure 3. The new technology transfer model.
Source: TiLab
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transaction costs related to the exchange of in-
formation, knowledge, services and innovation.
Such a flow of know-how is indeed bi-direc-
tional, and needs to be built with a long-term
perspective. It is therefore useful to have struc-
tures that are able to interact and use resources
outside the group and to transform a vision or a
clue into scenarios and business opportunities
which can be developed inside or outside the
Group. This is indeed the task that Tilab was
assigning to the Future Centre in Venice. The role
of this Centre was to analyse the market, under-
stand and translate demands coming from poten-
tial customers, promote and sell ICT solutions
available like shelf innovations.
Within the framework of these structural
changes, the role assigned to the Future Centre
could be regarded as a point of reference for firms
outside the Group that wanted to interact with
TiLab or use some of the technologies and
products of TiLab research activities. The Centre
could rely on the consistent portfolio of innova-
tions developed throughout the years by Cselt,
and the new (market oriented) projects started by
Tilab.
4.3. The monitoring and creation of new
competences
The focus on internal human resources has to be
a priority for Tilab, since the costs of deploying
human resources at a research centre has incre-
ased in recent years. Financial incentives inte-
grated the already existent non-monetary benefits
typical of the research activity, such as a flexible
working environment, a constant update pro-
gramme, and the possibility to be part of the peer
recognition system.
In general terms, the presence of a high turn-
over of human resources in a research lab has
both positive and negative consequences. Indeed,
new entries carry with them new ideas and also
important links with outside institutions. The flow
out of personnel is moreover useful if directed
toward other companies of the same group. The
research centre in this case ‘forges the competen-
cies’ needed for the management of the group.
High turnover has however other more dis-
turbing consequences and quite relevant costs. In
the first place, it becomes more difficult to manage
long-term projects. Moreover, the spillover of
know-how and key-competences might favour
competitors rather than other companies of the
group.
Traditionally, Cselt turnover has been rather
low, in spite of the enormous pressures of the
market and the presence of new actors hunting for
competencies. The fact that the Centre was located
in Turin could partially explain this fact, since in
most cases, Cselt employees would need to move
away from the city in order to accept a competitive
job offer elsewhere. Geographic positioning repre-
sents, therefore, a natural barrier to the spillover
of precious human resources.
In 1999, the management implemented relevant
changes to the professional system of the firm,
qualifying three different roles, the technical
leader, the project manager, and the competence
(or cluster) manager. These reforms reflected the
adoption of a matrix model of the business units.
Moreover during the same year, Cselt started
a programme to facilitate mobility within the
various areas of the Centre, and technical update.
Besides the activities of traditional competence
retention, in 2001 Tilab started to support
internal spin-off processes and incubator struc-
tures, in order to promote a sort of ‘controlled
spillover’ of its personnel. Researchers were given
the possibility of developing their projects in a
quasi-market environment, with the necessary
autonomy, but not with all the risks connected
with normal entrepreneurial activity.
The strategy for talent scouting changed as
well. A new branch, called ICT Skill Building
experimented with new ways of getting contacting
and entering the Group, much more flexible and
‘customized’ than previous ones. Besides the
possibility of internships, graduation/PhD theses,
collaborations with other research institutes and
universities, initiatives such as Dreambay were
used to attract young people with an entrepre-
neurial aspiration and sound technical back-
ground, even if not necessarily connected with
academia. Furthermore, another task was to
develop initiatives to strengthen ICT competences
already present inside the Group. Priorities for
2001 were e-learning, e-university and publication
of technical newsletters.
5. Conclusions
The cases of CRF and TiLab analysed in this
study confirm that the definition of strategic and
organizational issues in large R&D centres is a
complex, multifaceted process. A number of
factors influence each other and contribute to
determine the overall framework. Some of these
factors have to do with external conditions, such
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as the emergence of new technological disciplines
and paradigms, the changes in the structure of
specific industrial sectors, changes in demand
conditions, important ‘historical’ events, and so
on. Some other factors are more closely related to
internal conditions, and include corporate gover-
nance assets, top managers’ ability to identify and
implement organizational solutions, the influence
of leading individuals in determining strategies for
the laboratories, etc.
Despite this common framework, the two cases
differ in the operational solutions that have been
implemented in order to face those changes. On
the one hand, TiLab management decided to
abandon the model of the traditional research
lab, in favour of a system integration approach.
The goal was indeed to create an innovation
company, whose core productions were innova-
tions and innovation management. In this new
business model, the attraction and retention of
key human resources, and the creation of new
business opportunities through controlled spin-
off processes became a relevant feature. Differ-
ently, CRF has focused its attention in defining
efficient procedures for the management of tech-
nology transfer, mainly to local SMEs. In this, it
has been very innovative in finding new ways to
analyse customer’s needs, to develop proper pro-
ducts, to transfer human capital, and to manage
researchers’ turnover.
However, a deeper analysis shows that the
difference between the two cases is even bigger.
Basically, CRF has managed to find out –
through hard bottom-up work – an original
model which guarantees its existence and even
growth in periods characterized by decreasing
investments in R&D. Particularly severe obser-
vers might argue that the obsession with custo-
mers’ needs can be an obstacle to proper effort in
high-risk, long-term research areas, that should
be achieved especially through publicly funded
research projects. The continuous renewal of
research staff is another strategic asset where
scientific and technological competencies become
quickly obsolete for state-of-the-art research
purposes, but are certainly valid for applicative
tasks in manufacturing firms. It is rather curious
to notice that all this has happened without direct
intervention from the corporate level of Fiat,
which somehow limited its responsibilities to
‘accepting’ the new model. Several indicators
show that the CRF model is now consolidated; it
might well be changed in the future or show
relevant weaknesses, but it has been well assimi-
lated and understood within the research centre
and among partner companies, as well as among
top management which is at present trying to
relaunch Fiat in the international market.
The Cselt/TiLab story has not been character-
ized by an equally clear, consistent and long-
lasting model. The changes which have taken
place in the TLC sector and specifically in the
R&D centre’s ownership have not allowed the
emergence of a robust strategic direction. Top
management in the Telecom Group has probably
spent a lot of effort in understanding how to deal
with the TLC sector, and only after that has tried
to devise a strategy for the R&D lab. None-
theless, a few concepts and changes became quite
clear among researchers who in the past had been
asked to search for scientific excellence. Strategy
building and behaviour alignment has been so far
rather difficult in TiLab. First of all, because
during Colaninno’s period there was probably no
clear idea about what to do with a large R&D
centre. Second, because in the last months of
Colaninno’s period and in the early Pirelli period,
the project of joining together venture capital
competencies and assets, and scientific and tech-
nological resources has become much clearer, but
would require an even stronger commitment in
communication, diffusion and incentives for re-
searchers. In a moment when the transition in
TiLab required still more resources and open
support from the new top management, recent
changes seem to suggest that indeed the intention
is to change, once again, strategy, and to refocus
the activities of the ‘innovation factory’ towards
more traditional R&D services for the Group.
Further analysis on the future performance of
Tilab and the Telecom Italia Group will be need-
ed to fully appreciate the direction and success of
these choices.
The different nature of technologies, services
and products in the two cases also has an
influence on the solutions adopted. In CRF most
technologies are independent and standalone, so
that research units can easily be set up and ab-
andoned. In TiLab, the more pervasive systemic
nature of products and services in TLC makes it
harder to ‘pack and sell’ specific outputs, so that
the more difficult solution of starting spin-off
companies has been identified.
The success of these strategies in the long-run is
not completely clear. But it will definitely depend
upon the capability that the two organizations
will show in order to create a correct balance
between short-term and long-term objectives, bet-
ween exploration of research results and exploita-
tion of new scientific and technological paths.
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